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NOTE
TIPPING THE BALANCE OF POWER:
EMPLOYER INTRUSION ON EMPLOYEE
PRIVACY THROUGH TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION
Massachusetts senator Edward Kennedy remembers, "I ran for
the Senate at a very young age, and one of the issues used by the
opponents was that I had never worked a day in my life. One day
I was going through one of the factories in my state to meet the
workers. And I will never forget the fellow who came up to me,
shook my hand, and said, 'Mr. Kennedy, I understand that you
have never worked a day in your life. Let me tell you, you
haven't missed a thing.""
INTRODUCTION
Though most people need their jobs, it is regrettably rare that
they like or love them. Courts and legislatures, with some
success, have created statutory and common laws to protect the
1 See BOB DOLE, GREAT POLITICAL WIT: LAUGHING ALMOST ALL THE WAY TO THE
WHITE HOUSE 25 (Doubleday ed. 1998).
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dignity of workers. 2 Technological innovation, however, which
permits employers to electronically monitor their workers, now
permits employers to compromise their employees by violating
their right to privacy in a way not anticipated by earlier laws.
Worker integrity and the welfare of the labor force is contingent
upon successful management of these new monitoring devices,
and the preservation of privacy in the workplace. 3
Court decisions have provided guidance for recognizing privacy
rights in stating that "a guarantee of certain areas or zones of
privacy does exist under the Constitution."4 These rights have
origins in the Bill of Rights5 and the 14th amendment,6 and have
been applied with constitutional justification under the vehicles
2 See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L, No. 90-202, 81
Stat. 602, 602-08 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§621-34); Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§701-16, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§2000(c)-(e) (1994)); see also Connie Barba, "That's No 'Beep, That's My Boss:" Congress
Seeks to Disconnect the Secrecy of Telephone Monitoring in the Workplace, 21 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 881, 902 (1988) (discussing protection of worker dignity); Michael Curran, On
Common Ground: Using Cultural Bias Factors to Deconstruct Asia Pacific Labor, 30 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L. & ECON. 349, 432 (1996-97) (discussing statute protecting dignity of
employees).
3 See Larry 0. Natt Gantt, II, An Affront to Human Dignity: Electronic Mail
Monitoring in the Private Sector Workplace, 8 HARV. J.L. TECH. 345, 347 (1995) (observing
"the freedom from monitoring by one's employer is increasingly perceived as being outside
the scope of reasonable privacy expectations"); see also Ian Ballon, Internet Issues for the
Travel Industry, 790 PLI/CoMM 11, 124 (1999) (discussing privacy rights in modern age of
communications); Nina Stilman, Wrongful Discharge: Contract, Public Policy and Tort
Claims, 592 PLIJLIT 1191, 1325 (1998) (discussing privacy in workplace).
4 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (arguing that pregnant mother has
fundamental right to choose to have abortion); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 845 (1992) (affirming fundamental right established in Roe with qualified
exceptions); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (establishing right of
privacy); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F. 2d. 826, 838 (1987) (stating that there are zones of
privacy under Constitution).
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. 1 (stating that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech , or of the press; or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances"); see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486
(establishing Constitutional source of right to privacy); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 621-22 (1886) (invoking 4th and 5th Amendments to prevent government invasion of
private residence); Maureen S. Dorney, Privacy and the Internet, 19 HASTINGS COM/ENT
L.J. 635, 637 (1997) (stating that privacy rights emanated from Bill of Rights); Mark
Silverstein, Privacy Rights in State Constitutions: Model for Illinois?, 1989 ILL. L. REV.
215, 221 (1989) (stating that court in Griswold found support for zone of privacy in Bill of
Rights).
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. 14 (stating that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law
which shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the
law"); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that 1 4th Amendment
"liberty" language protects people's privacy in home); David Crump, How do the Courts
Discover Unenumerated Fundamental Rights? Cataloguing the Methods of Judicial
Alchemy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 795, 895-96 (1996) (stating privacy rights come from
141h Amendment).
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of substantive due process 7 and equal protection. 8 The right to
privacy, however, can be significantly affected by the context in
which it is claimed, and exists only to a limited extent in the
workplace. 9 Public sector employees are now granted almost all
the rights under the constitution,' 0 but unfortunately similar
protections have not emerged for private sector workers." This
disparity is partially understandable since federal protections do
not automatically apply to States or private sector entities. 12 It is
7 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (discussing due process and
right to die); Einstadt v. Baird, 406 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (holding that due process
prevented conviction for distributing contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that law against contraceptive use is violative of due process
rights).
8 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (holding that statute preventing
interracial marriage violated fundamentally private right to choose whom one marries
and violated equal protection clause of 14th Amendment); see also Christina Jax, Same
Race Marriage - Why Not?, 4 WIDNER J. PUB. L. 461, 485 (1995) (stating that people are
afforded same rights under equal protection which includes right to zone of privacy);
Michael K. Stinson, Fundamental Rights in the "Gray Area." The Right to Privacy Under
the Minnesota Constitution, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 383, 411 (1994) (recognizing
relationship between equal protection and zone of privacy).
9 See Hannibal F. Heredin, Is There Privacy in the Workplace?: Guaranteeing Broader
Privacy Rights for Workers Under California Law, 22 Sw. U.L. REV. 307, 307-08 (1992)
(stating that "employees as well as applicants are subjected to a barrage of intrusive tests
and monitoring"); Michael F. Rosenblum, The Expanding Scope of Workplace Security and
Employee Privacy Issues, 3 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 77, 78 (stating that "privacy rights of
employees must be considered by employers"); see, e.g., McAuliffe v. Mayor & City of New
Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (rejecting claim by stating that "[t]he petitioner
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be
policeman").
10 See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 513 (1980) (holding First Amendment forbids
government officials to discharge public employees on basis of their party affiliation);
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (stating that loss of 1st Amendment rights to
employees "constitutes irreparable injury"); see also Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S.
62, 79 (1990) (holding that hiring decisions involving low-level public employees may not
be based on party affiliations).
11 See, e.g., Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F. 2d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 1980)
(holding that employer suspecting employee misconduct could listen in on that employees
phone calls); Barba, supra note 2, at 902 (discussing limited privacy rights of employees);
Heredin, supra note 9 (describing the limits on employee rights); Rosenblum, supra note
9, at 78 (stating that employees have limited rights); Mike Tonsing, Privacy in the
Workplace, 46 FED. LAW 42, 43 (June 1999) (stating that in most states telephone
monitoring is legitimate if done for business purposes). But see Watkins v. L.M. Berry &
Co., 704 F. 2d 577, 583 (1983) (holding that simply because employer suspected particular
employee was going to quit he could not monitor that employee's calls).
12 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Soc. Servs. Dept., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989)
(holding that cause of action for due process protections did not apply to family of child
beaten to retardation because of poor decision by state social worker); Flagg Bros., Inc. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978) (holding that warehouseman's lien under U.C.C. is not
state action and Constitution therefore does not apply); Laura B. Pinkus & Clayton
Trotter, The Disparity Between Public and Private Sector Employee Privacy Protections: A
Call for Legitimate Privacy Rights for Private Sector Workers, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 51, 55
(1995) (suggesting that there are inherent problems with state-by-state privacy
protection). But see 42 U.S.C. §1981 (1977) (providing private sector statutory protections
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surprising, however, because the earliest form of workplace
regulations applied to the private sector.13
The basic purpose of this note is to highlight the lack of privacy
protections afforded to private sector employees.14 In particular,
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,15 and
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,16 though
passed explicitly to protect employee privacy, 17 allow employers
an alarming amount of discretion to intercept the phone
conversations and e-mail messages of their employees.' 8 These
forms of legislation need further thought and revision to keep
pace with technological advances in monitoring equipment and
the power these advances give to employers.19 Only with
appropriate regulation can the integrity of workers and the
civility of their relationship with their employers be maintained.
to workers against employment discrimination).
13 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 119 (1942) (upholding 1938 Agricultural
Adjustment Act's quota on farm production even within confines of one farmer's private
use of his wheat crop); U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941) (upholding Fair Labor
Standards Act regulation of private and public sector workers); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 80 (1937) (upholding National Labor Relations Act of
1935 and its challenge to unfair labor practices as within jurisdictional scope of commerce
power and thereby subject to monitoring).
14 See e.g., Julia Turner Baumhart, The Employer's Right to Read Employee E-Mail:
Protecting Property or Personal Prying?, 8 LAB. LAW. 923, 923 (1992) (stating that reading
electronic messages may violate employee privacy rights); Gantt supra note 3, at 345
(observing that because of sophisticated nature of contemporary workplace monitoring
"modern offices are becoming electronic sweatshops").
15 18 U.S.C. §§2510-20 (1994).
16 18 U.S.C. §§2510-21 (1988).
17 See U.S. v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 514 (1974) (stating Act's goal was to be to
prohibit "all interceptions of oral and wire communications except those specifically
provided for in the act"); U.S. v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346, 351 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding that
protection of employee privacy is basic purpose of "Act"); see also Carol M. Bast, What's
Bugging You? Inconsistencies and Irrationalities of the law of Eavesdropping, 47 DEPAUL
L. REV. 837, 842 (1998) (stating that legislation was passed "to prevent the interception of
oral and wire communications without the consent of at least on party").
18 See Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Technology Advances in the Information Age: Effects on
Workplace Privacy Issues, SCO8 A.L.I. - A-B.A. 599, 611 (1997) (stating that pursuant to
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act employers can listen in on employee calls for
legitimate business purposes); Connie L. Michales, Employment Law Considerations:
Stress Management and Elimination of Bias: The Risk Management Perspective, 555
PLI/LIT 285, 339 (1996) (stating that because of legislation employers should only intrude
on employees with the advice of legal counsel based on legitimate business concerns).
19 See Giordano, 416 U.S. at 515 (stating that technological require caution in
permitting wiretapping); see also Richard D. Mark, High Technology Legislation as an
Eighteenth Century Process, 6 STAN. L. POL'Y REV. 17, 18 (1994) (stating that "scientific
innovation does not slow to allow judges and legislators to keep pace"). But see Patricia
M. Worth, The Impact of New and Emerging Telecommunication Technologies: A Call to
the Rescue of the Attorney Client Privilege, 39 HOWARD L.J. 437, 454 (1996) (stating that
Congress' "effort to keep pace with technological advancements evinces a steadfast
commitment to technology").
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Part I of this note provides a description of the advantages that
employers have over employees in establishing employment
contracts. These advantages suggest that employees are ill-
equipped to defend their privacy interest for fear of losing their
jobs and highlight the need for statutory protection. Part II
discusses the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 and Part III discusses the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986. These statutes were designed in part to
protect the privacy of workers and their relative success will be
considered in some detail.
I. THE WORKPLACE BALANCE OF POWER
To understand the danger of unregulated employee monitoring
more concretely, the different goals of employers and employees
in the employment relationship must be considered. Employers
seek maximum efficiency and earnings, and view the monitoring
of phone and e-mail use by employees as a way to "maintain
production standards, spot bottlenecks, and plan personnel and
equipment needs."20 One court, in recognizing this need,
elaborated on its importance by remarking "[i]nterception of calls
reasonably suspected to involve non - business matters might be
justifiable by an employer who has had difficulty controlling
personal use of business equipment through warnings."21
Employees, on the other hand, seek higher wages, benefits, and
dignity. They find monitoring of their phone and computer
communications intrusive and unnecessary. 22
Satisfying the competing needs of employers and employees is
difficult because employees are almost always at a disadvantage
and therefore unable to protect their privacy interests. 23 It is true
20 See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR: NEW
TECHNOLOGY, NEW TENSIONS 5 (1987).
21 See Briggs v. American Filter, Co., 630 F.2d 414, 420 n.8 (5th Cir. 1980). The court
in this case was also concerned with the need of employers to maintain confidentiality
with respect to certain trade secrets. Id. at 420.
22 See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 8 (stating that "[tiwo
major objections to electronic monitoring of individual performance are allegations that it
contributes to employee stress and stress related illness and that it contributes to an
atmosphere of distrust is the workplace"); see also Heredin, supra note 9, at 307-08
(explaining how employees can be exposed to distressful and intrusive tests).
23 Though this inequity is widely recognized. It should be noted that government
intervention is more frequent when the work relationship affects commerce. To quote
from the landmark case, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 80 (1937),
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that no law requires employers to hire any particular worker or
any workers at all, nor are employees required to work, but
employers are more likely to have additional job applicants than
prospective employees are to have additional jobs opportunities.
Often, then, an employment contract is presented and accepted
on terms that are not of the employee's choosing.24
Once an employment contract is created the problem is
compounded because it is less likely that employees will bring
suits to protect their privacy interests. First, the labor market is
flooded with workers and employees may be willing to sacrifice
their rights for a much needed job. Also, litigation costs are more
difficult for an employee (as opposed to an employer) to absorb,
which serves as a disincentive to bringing privacy suits. 25
Additionally, the situation is difficult because employees willing
to challenge monitoring may not be aware that their privacy is
being violated, as technology conceals the monitoring from their
observation. 26
As Americans spend a disproportionate amount of their lives
working, it is essential that their workplace rights are
protected. 27 Without suitable laws to ensure such protection
permitting government intervention: "[I]t is idle to say that the effect [of labor strife on
commerce] would be indirect or remote. It is obvious that it would be immediate and
catastrophic. We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest fact of our national life and to
deal with questions of direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum. [Industrial
strife is] a matter of the most urgent national concern." Id. See also Mark A. Rothstein,
Wrongful Refusal to Hire: Attaching the Other Half of the Employment-at- Will Rule, 24
CONN. L. REV. 97, 117 (1991). The author suggests exceptions to the employment-at-will
approach because of the inequality in bargaining power of the parties. Id.
24 See e.g. STEVEN L. WILBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS
(Lexis Law Publishing 2d ed. 1993) (demonstrating bargaining disadvantages of
employees).
25 See Stefan Rutzel, Snitching for the Common Good In Search of a Response to the
Legal Problems Posed by Environmental Whistleblowing, 14 TEMP. ENVTL L. & TECH. J. 1,
50 (1995) (stating that [t]he high costs associated with litigation may deter an employee
from going to court").
26 See Gantt, supra note 3, at 346-47 (stating that employers can invade employees
privacy with little or no detection).
27 See Cynthia Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of
Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 734 (1997) (stating that workplace
should be recognized as important forum for discussion); see also Mark Barenberg,
Democracy in the law of the Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible
Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 758, 761 (1994) (proposing empowerment of employees
through various programs including in-house participatory and representative schemes);
Terry S. Boone, Selected Topics on Employment & Labor Law: Violence in the Workplace
and the New Right to Carry Gun Law - What Employers Need to Know, 37 TEX. L. REV.
873, 874 (1996) (stating that employer has obligation to protect employee); David Weil,
Are Mandated Health and Safety Committees Substituted For or Supplements to Labor
Unions?, 52 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 339, 340 (1999) (stating work councils, labor
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them, they are bound to be exploited by their employers. 28 They
need their jobs and will not risk them to solve inequities, but new
technological developments have outpaced the existing sources of
privacy protection and have grossly shifted the balance of power
between employers and employees. One professor explained how
the employment contract in such a context is becoming more akin
to a contractual relationship of adhesion:
These new monitoring technologies have intensified
employee privacy concerns because the instruments abolish
the desirable balance of power between employers and
employees. The instruments allow employers to invade the
personal lives of employees with little or no chance of
detection. Furthermore, electronic monitoring allows
employers to manipulate, access, and collect information
about employees in greater amounts than reasonably
possible.29
Two acts were designed to prevent this type of exploitation.
Each will be considered in some detail below.
management committees and other forms of worker participation can improve employee
involvement in workplace).
28 This was not the early conception of employment contracts. For example, in Adair
v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908) the Court advocated a mutuality of
obligation between the employer and employee whereby the employer could fire the
employee for any time at any reason and the employee could quit at any time for any
reason. After the Lochner Era, however, the courts began to acknowledge the inherent
weakness of employee bargaining power. See, e.g., Chiodo v. General Waterworks Corp.,
413 P. 2d. 891, 894 (1966) where the court held that equitable principles demanded good
faith from the employer. Id. See generally Sarah G. Burns, Evidence of a Sexually Hostile
Workplace: What is it and how Should it be Assessed After Harris v. Forklift System, Inc.,
21 NYU REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357, 415 (1994). The author notes that the Supreme
Court has stated that it restricted employer activities which exploited the employee power
deficiency. Id.
29 See Gantt, supra note 3, at 345 (summarizing concerns about technological
advances in employer monitoring capabilities); see also Rod Dixon, Windows Nine-to-Five
Smyth v. Pillsbury and the Scope of an Employee's Rights of Privacy in Employer
Communications, 2 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 4 (1997) (discussing impact of computer
communication technology in workplace); Peter Schnaitman, Building a Community
Through Workplace E-mail: The New Privacy Frontier, 5 MiCH. TELECOM. TECH. L. REV.,
177, 177 (1999) (suggesting that technology of e-mail presents new issue of workplace
privacy); Scott A. Sundstrom, You've Got Mail (And the Government Knows it): Applying
the Fourth Amendment to Workplace E-Mail Monitoring, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2064, 2064
(1998) (stating that workplace e-mail monitoring is increasing because it is simple for
employers to use on large scale).
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II. THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF
1968
The Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 196830
(hereinafter "the Act") is a federal act that was constructed, in
part, to protect the integrity and privacy of employees in the
workplace. 31 Title III of the Act has significant penalty
provisions, 32 and regulates wiretapping and eavesdropping by
private individuals and governmental entities. 33 In United States
v. Giordano et al.,34 the Supreme Court provided a useful
definition of the Act's purpose stating: "The purpose of the
legislation, which was passed in 1968, was effectively to prohibit,
30 18 U.S.C. §§2510-20 (1994).
31 See Janet Boeth Jones, Annotation: Application to Extension Telephones of Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 Pertaining to Interception of
Wire Communications, 58 A.L.R. FED 594, 598 (1998) (discussing application of Act in a
workplace context); Todd R. Smyth, Eavesdropping on Extension Telephone As Invasion of
Privacy, 49 A.L.R. 4TH 430, 451 (1999) (discussing the Act and employees' right to
privacy); see also Carol M. Bast, supra, note 18, at 842 (1998) (stating that the Act was
designed to prevent interception of wired conversations without the consent of at least one
party).
32 See 18 U.S.C. §2520 (1994). §2520 provides that:
In general.., any person whose wire, oral or electronic communication is
intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil
action recover from the person or entity which engaged in that violation such relief as
may be appropriate.
Relief - In an action under this section, appropriate relief includes-such preliminary
and other equitable or declaratory relief as may be appropriate; damages under
subsection (c) and punitive damages in appropriate cases; and a reasonable attorney's
fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.
See also Janet Boeth Jones, supra note 31, at 825 (noting that Act has provisions for
criminal and civil penalties);
Elizabeth Williams, Applicability, in Civil Action, Of Provisions of Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Prohibiting Interception of Communications (18
U.S.C. §2511(1)) to Interceptions by Spouse, or Spouse's Agent, of Conversations of Other
Spouse, 139 A.L.R. FED. 517, 525 (stating Title III of Act provides criminal and civil
penalties for unauthorized interceptions of certain communications).
33 See 18 U.S.C. §2511(1)(a) (1994). §2511(1)(a) generally prohibits the use of
wiretapping and eavesdropping. §2511(1)(a) states that:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter... any person who (a)
intentionally intercepts , endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to
intercept, any wire, oral or electronic communication; ... shall be punished as
provided in subsection (4) or shall be subject to a suit as provided in subsection (5).
See also Mvichael J. Kaplan, Construction and Application of Provisions of Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 Authorizing Civil Cause of Action by Person Whose
Wire or Oral Communication Is Intercepted, Disclosed, or Used in Violation of Act, 25
A.L.R. FED. 759, 767 (1999) (discussing Act and its application to government agents);
Elaine K. Zipp, Who May Apply or Authorize Application for Order to Intercept Wire or
Oral Communications Under Title III Of Omnibus Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
64 A.L.R. FED. 115, 119-20 (1999) (stating Act is effort to strictly limit use of wiretapping
and electronic surveillance as techniques for acquiring information).
34 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
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on the pain of criminal and civil penalties, all interceptions of
oral and wire communications, except those specifically provided
for in the Act."35
Although on its face the language of the Act appears broad
enough to curtail employer exploitation of employee privacy, 36 it
fails in several respects. 37 Most importantly, the Act has
exceptions to its general prohibition on wiretapping, 38 which
undermine the privacy expectations of employees. 39 These
35 Id. at 514; see also Jones, supra note 31, at 598 (stating purpose of statute is to
prohibit the secret monitoring or wire communications).
36 See Smythe, supra note 31, at 436 (stating that Act now provides remedy for
privacy invasion); Paul F. Gerhart, Employee Privacy Rights in the United States, 17
COMP. LAB. L. 175, 176 (1995) (noting that Title III "particularly shield[s] private sector
employees from employer invasion of privacy"); see also Gantt, supra note 3, at 347
(stating that statute has language that seems sufficient to protect privacy interests).
37 See S. Rep. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.; see also Julia Turner Baumhart, The
Employer's Right to Read the Employee E-Mail: Protecting Property or Personal Prying?, 8
LAB. LAW. 923, 924 (1992) (stating that Title III was amended by ECPA to "atone for what
Congress saw as deficiencies in individual privacy protections"); Jose L. Nunez,
Regulating the Airwaves: The Governmental Alternative to Avoid the Cellular Uncertainty
on Privacy and the Attorney Client Privilege, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 479, 485 (1994)
(stating that purpose of ECPA was acknowledgement by Congress of need "to update and
clarify the Federal privacy protections and standards in light of the dramatic changes in
new computer and telecommunications technologies").
38 See 18 U.S.C. §2511(2)(d) (1994); 18 U.S.C. §2510(5)(a) (1994). §2511(2)(d) is a
consent exception providing that:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law
to intercept a wire, oral. Or electronic communication where such person is a party to
the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior
consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the
purpose of committing any criminal or tortuous act in violation of the constitution of
laws of the United States or of any state.
Id.
§2510(5)(a) is a business telephone exception providing that:
Electronic, mechanical, or other device does not include: any telephone or telegraph
instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof, (i) furnished to the
subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the
ordinary course of its business or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection
to the facilities of such service and used in the ordinary course of its business.
See also Jones, supra note 31, at 600. There, the author notes that in United States v.
Sturdivant, 9 M.J. 923 (1980), the court held that the first sergeant's use of extension
phone to intercept phone call between members of his battery was in ordinary course of
business and came within statute's exception in section 2510(4). Id. David Neil King,
Privacy Issues in the Private Sector Workplace: Protection From Electronic Surveillance
And the Emerging Privacy Gap, 67 CAL. L. REV. 441, 451 (1994). The author notes that
under the Act, in a prima facie case, the defense may rebut the plaintiffs evidence or raise
defenses or exceptions. Id.
39 See Gantt, supra note 3, at 345 (summarizing concerns about technological
encroachments on employee privacy); Jones, supra note 31 at 598 (discussing interception
of conversation between members of police and narcotics bureaus). Cf. Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Street Act of 1968, S. Rep. No. 1097, 9th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, reprinted in
1968 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS 2153, (noting that Title III was enacted to enhance
the privacy of wire and oral communications).
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exceptions are known as the consent exception 40 and the
business extension telephone exception, 41 and will be considered
in some detail below.
A. The Consent Exception to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968
The consent exception to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 permits employers to intercept employee
phone calls "where such person is a party to the communication
or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior
consent." 42 The courts have thus far held that the consent for
these interceptions may be actual, or implied,43 and can be
"inferred 'from surrounding circumstances."' 44 Court decisions
have further indicated that the consent requirement is to be
construed broadly, not casually,45 and that liability will not
attach to employers because of inadvertent interceptions. 46
The consent exception was interpreted by the First Circuit to
serve as a safe harbor for those who intercept phone calls without
40 See 18 U.S.C. §2511(2)(d) (1994).
41 See 18 U.S.C. §2510(5)(a) (1994).
42 See 18 U.S.C. §2511(2)(d) (1994); see also U.S. v. Shields, 675 F.2d 1152, 1156 (11th
Cir. 1982) (discussing application of consent exception); U.S. v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373,
1377 (5th Cir. 1978) (referring to consent exception); U.S. v. Ransom, 515 F.2d 885, 889
(5th Cir. 1975) (explaining consent exception).
43 See United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that
"[c]onsent may be either express or implied"); United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378
(2d Cir. 1987) (noting that consent may either be expressed or implied under Title III).
44 See, e.g., Williams v. Poulos, 11 F.3d 271, 281 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating "implied
consent is 'consent in fact' which is inferred 'from surrounding circumstances indicating
that the party knowingly agreed to the surveillance"(quoting Amen, 831 F.2d at 378));
U.S. v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 292 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating consent may be express or
may be implied in fact from "surrounding circumstances indicating that the [defendant]
knowingly agreed to the surveillance).
45 See, e.g., Gilday v. Dubois, 124 F.3d 277, 296 (lst Cir. 1997) (noting that 'consent'
exception under Title III is 'construed broadly' as encompassing implied consent"
(citations omitted)); Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 116 (1st Cir. 1990) (agreeing
with Second Circuit that "Congress intended the consent requirement to be construed
broadly"(quoting Amen, 831 F.2d at 378)); United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693
(2d Cir. 1996) (stating "[t]he legislative history [of Title III] shows that Congress intended
the consent requirement to be construed broadly"(quoting Amen 831 F.2d at 378)).
46 See, e.g., United States v. Townsend, 987 F. 2d 927, 930 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that
in Title III claims defendants act must have been product of defendant's conscious
objective rather than product of mistake or accident); Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1534
(5th Cir. 1994) (noting that "the wording of the statute [Title III], while broad, requires
that interceptions be intentional before liability attaches, thereby excluding inadvertent
interceptions"(quoting Thomas v. Dulaney, 907 F.2d 744, 748 (10th Cir. 1992)); see also
Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581-85 (11th Cir. 1983) (discussing notion of
inadvertent interception in the workplace).
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explicit consent. In Griggs-Ryan v. Smith,47 for example, the
plaintiff was a tenant at a campground which the defendant,
Smith, operated. 48 Lodgers at the grounds were permitted to use
Smith's telephone and were informed that their conversations
were being taped by Smith, who was attempting to record
obscene calls she had been receiving. 49 On the day in question,
Smith answered the phone and gave it to plaintiff (as the call
was for him).50 Smith was about to hang up the phone when she
heard what she suspected to be information about a drug
conversation. 51 She opted to tape the conversation and the
plaintiff was arrested following a search of his house. 52
The court found that Smith's behavior was protected under the
consent exception to Title III and that her taping was
permissible. 53 The court explained that the plaintiff was acting at
his own risk since Smith never informed him that she would stop
monitoring calls once she determined they were not harassing. 54
In United States v. Amen,55 the Second Circuit reached a similar
conclusion when the court held that the consent exception
permitted evidentiary use of phone tapes made in a prison
because the prisoners had received jail house handbooks alerting
them to the prison's recording procedures. 56
In the context of workplace privacy, the consent exception
retains the same legal character. In Deal v. Spears,57 a United
States District Court considered whether employer taping of
47 904 F.2d 112 (1st Cir. 1990).
48 See Griggs at 114.
49 See id.
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 See id.
53 See id. at 119.
54 See id. at 117 (noting that plaintiff offered no evidence suggesting that he had not
given consent to taping of call).
55 831 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1987).
56 See id. at 379-80 (holding that reading of handbooks constituted consent); see also
U.S. v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996)(explaining Amen decision); People v.
Goldfeld, 400 N.Y.S. 2d 229, 234 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (stating where one party had
consented to taped telephone conversation tape recording was not considered "intercepted
communication" within Act); Jared D. Beeson, Cyberprivacy on the Corporate Intranet:
Does the Law Allow Private Sector Employers to Read Their Employees' E-Mail?, 20
HAWAII L. REV. 165, 205-06 (1998) (applying consent exception to email). But see Crooker
v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 497 F. Supp. 500, 503 (D. Conn. 1980) (holding that prisoners'
knowledge of call monitoring did not constitute consent).
57 780 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Ark. 1991).
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employee calls would be exempt from violating the Act, when the
employer had threatened that he "might" put in a pay phone or
"monitor" employee calls.58 The court, applying a standard
reminiscent of those in Griggs and Amen, held that an employer's
threats to use a phone tap were not sufficient to imply consent of
the employee. 59 In Ali v. Douglas Cable Communications,60 a
District Court considered a case in which an employer monitored
employee phone calls, and "did not distinguish between business
or personal calls."61 Though the employer had posted and
distributed office notices about phone monitoring, 62 the court
held that consent had not been established sufficiently for a
motion for summary judgement to be granted for the defendant, 63
suggesting that consent was not clearly established because the
employer did not have a formal monitoring procedure which the
plaintiffs knew about.64
Though the disposition of these cases is consistent and fair, two
key points should be kept in mind. First, after establishing
consent or notifying an employee, an employer is free to monitor
58 See id. 622.
59 See id.; see also David Neil King, Privacy issues in the Private Sector Workplace:
Protection from Electronic Surveillance and the Emerging Privacy Gap, 67 S.CAL. L.REV.
441, 454 (1994) (stating that Deal was one of first cases to apply Griggs doctrine in
employment law context). See generally Kevin P. Kopp, Electronic Communications in the
Workplace: E-Mail Monitoring and the Right of Privacy, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 861,
882-83 (1998) (stating that consent exception was considered in Deal).
60 929 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Kan. 1996).
61 See id. at 1373. These calls were monitored because the defendant company
engaged in telephone customer service. Id. The calls were intended to be monitored for
training purposes. Id.
62 Id. at 1373 (noting that "[s]ome of the [employees] knew of the telephone
monitoring because the supervisors had used it during their training, and other
[employees], like the plaintiffs were not aware of it").
63 Id. at 1378 (holding that "a telephone extension used without authorization or
consent to record a private conversation" is not exempt from Act).
64 Id. at 1377; see also John D. Blackburne, Elliot I. Klayman, Richard 0. Nathan,
Invasion of Privacy: Refocusing the Tort in Private Sector Employment, 6 DE PAUL Bus.
L.J. 41, 58 (1994) (endorsing consent exception); Lieutenant Colonel LeEllen Coacher,
Permitting Systems Monitoring: When the Government Can Look and What it Can See, 46
A.F.L. REV. 155, 176 (1999) (setting forth importance of consent exception); Rochelle B.
Ecker, To Catch a Thief- The Private Employer's Guide to Getting and Keeping and Honest
Employee, 63 UMKC L. REV. 251, 267-68 (1994) (discussing requirements for employee
monitoring and employee methods for recovery); Jonathan J. Green, Electronic
Monitoring in the Workplace: The Need For Standards, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 438, 446
(1984) (arguing that objective standard of privacy depends on subjective expectations);
Thomas R. Greenberg, in E-Mail and Voice Mail: Employee Privacy and the Federal
Wiretap Statute, 44 AM. U.L. REV. 219, 245 (1994) (stating that nature of calls could
determine whether or not consent was given in noting other qualified theories of consent).
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an employee's phone calls.6 5 While this employer prerogative
alone is disturbing, consider scenarios in which the only phone
available to the employee is in the place of business. 66 Should an
employee be required to accept that all his or her calls from work
are being monitored by their employer? Second, there is a
distinct probability that many employers are monitoring their
employees without their knowledge or consent.67 Though the act
does grant employees statutory damages when their privacy
rights have been compromised, 68 it is unlikely that these
penalties serve as a deterrent for an employer who runs the risk
of being caught.69
B. The Title III Exemption for Business Extension Telephones
The second exception to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act is provided in §2510(5)(a). 70 This section excludes
equipment "furnished to the subscriber.., by a provider in the
ordinary course of its business and being used by the subscriber
in the ordinary course of its business." 71 This exemption is
commonly referred to as the "extension telephone exemption."72
65 See 18 U.S.C. §2511(2)(d), supra note 38; see also Giday v. Dubois, 124 F. 3d 277,
289 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that prerecorded message notifying inmate that their call
would be recorded was sufficient "consent" though inmate did not agree to it).
66 See, e.g., All v. Douglas Cable Communications, 929 F. Supp. 1362, 1377 (D. Kan.
1996) (discussing where employees could only make calls from work phones); Watkins v.
L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581 (11th Cir. 1983) (discussing where employees could
only make calls from work phones).
67 See Gantt, supra note 3 at 345 (noting that employers run little or no chance of
detection); Ballon, supra note 3 at 124 (noting increased employer power to intercept e-
mail messages without detection). See generally Frank J. Cavico, Invasion of Privacy in
the Private Employment Sector: Tortuous and Ethical Aspects, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1263,
1266 (1993) (stating that with technological growth employee privacy rights are
threatened).
68 See 18 U.S.C. §2520, supra note 32 (providing for punitive damages).
69 See Martha W. Barnett & Scott D. Makar, In the Ordinary Course of Business: The
Legal Limits of Workplace Wiretapping, 10 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 715, 717 (1988)
(observing that despite increase in employer workplace monitoring, few employers have
changed their workplace privacy policies); Gantt, supra note 3, at 347 (arguing that it is
difficult for employees to perceive monitoring and that they must rely on employer self-
monitoring); Giordano, supra, note 17, at 515 (indicating need for further wiretapping
regulations).
70 See 18 U.S.C. §2510(5)(a), supra note 38.
71 See 18 U.S.C. §2510(5)(a), supra note 38, at 5(a)(i).
72 See, e.g., Epps v. St. Mary's Hospital of Athens, Inc., 802 F.2d 412, 415 (11th Cir.
1986) (referring to exception as "extension telephone exception"); Watkins v. L.M. Berry
Co., 704 F.2d 577, 580 (11th Cir. 1983) (referring to exception as "business extension
exceptions"); Deal v. Spears, 780 F. Supp. 618, 622 (W.D. Ark. 1991) (stating that
defendant's claim that phone message was recorded in course of business was commonly
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The hallmark case in defining the limits of this exception is
Watkins v. L.M. Berry.73 In Watkins, the defendant, Berry
Company, had a policy of monitoring the solicitation of its
employees as part of its training program. 74 The monitoring was
done with an extension telephone, 75 which employees were told
that they could use to make unmonitored personal calls.76
Watkins used the phone to discuss an upcoming employment
interview with a friend and the call was monitored despite the
company's policy. 77 When Watkins' supervisor discovered her
intentions to seek new employment through the phone extension
he confronted her and she was fired. 78 The court held that a
personal call cannot be intercepted in the ordinary course of
business except for the employer to determine whether or not it
is personal. 79 It reversed the lower court grant of summary
judgement to the employer, remanding the case to determine
whether Watkins had given her consent to the call monitoring.80
The Watkins court expressed concern at how the course of the
business exception had been used in certain cases.81 It cited and
critiqued a decision in the Tenth Circuit which held that a three-
to-five minute call interception which resulted because the
conversation "sounded interesting" was not in violation of the Act
because it was not "willful" within the meaning of the statute.8 2
In Epps v. St. Mary's Hospital of Athens, Inc.,8 3 the conversation
called "extension telephone exception").
73 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983).
74 See id. at 579.
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 See id. The plaintiff later complained to her supervisor and was reinstated with
apologies. A week later she began work at her new job. Id.
79 See id. at 583 (stating that reasonable allowance of time is to be given to employers
to establish nature of call); see also United States v. Savage, 564 F.2d 728, 732 (5th Cir.
1997) (holding listening to call for 10-15 seconds was permissible because operator was
elderly). But see United States v. Axselle, 604 F.2d 1330, 1335 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding
that 3-5 minute interception was excusable).
80 See Watkins, 704 F.2d at 585 (11th Cir. 1983). But see Berry v. Funk, 331 U.S. App.
D.C. 62, 72 (U.S. App. D.C. 1998) (rejecting "clean hands" argument used in Murdock).
81 See Watkins, 704 F.2d at 584-85.
82 See U.S. v. Axselle, 604 F.2d 1330, 1335 (10th Cir. 1979) (describing its reaction to
decision as "less enthusiastic" because "[i]t absolutely contradicts the meaning of the
operative language (in the statute)"); C.f., U.S. v. Paul, 614 F.2d 115, 117 (6th Cir. 1980)
(allowing routine monitoring for security reasons); U.S. v. Savage, 564 F.2d 728, 732 (5th
Cir. 1977) (permitting overhearing due to operator's age).
83 802 F.2d 412 (11th Cir. 1986).
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of an employee in a hospital emergency room was recorded which
contained disparaging comments about a hospital supervisor.8 4
Consistent with the Tenth Circuit's decision, this court held that
such gossip constituted business interests of the employer.8 5
Unfortunately, the court's holdings with regard to this
exception are rather unclear. How can the interception of calls
about career moves be considered "personal" and violative of the
statute, while employee gossip about a boss is determined
"business related" and interceptable?86  This flaw subjects
employee privacy rights to an unjust relativity.8 7 Employees
willing to attempt suits with such precarious precedents usually
need proof that the employer recorded personal employee phone
calls.88 As the business extension telephone exemption does not
require employee consent when taping occurs one can not help
but wonder how any employee can protect himself from abuse.
How might an employee check the discretion of employer tapping
if it does not recognize its existence?
III. THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT OF 1986
In 1986, Congress Amended the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Street Act of 196889 to compensate for deficiencies in the
privacy protections of this act in lieu of new technology.90 The
amendment was intended, in part, to bring E-Mail and voicemail
84 See id. at 413 -14.
85 See id. at 417.
86 See Frank C. Morris, Jr., Privacy and Defamation in Employment, SB 42 ALI-ABA
201, 219-20 (1997) (discussing inconsistency in court definitions of the employers
"ordinary course of business").
87 See, e.g., Frank T. Cavico, Invasion of Privacy in the Private Employment Sector:
Tortuous and Ethical Respects, 30 Hous. L. REV. 1263, 1345 (1993) (suggesting that
employee rights to privacy should be balanced by courts against the employer's right to
run business effectively); Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy and the
Employment Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 671, 706, 729 (1996) (discussing risks
employees take in resisting monitoring practices because of the complex standard).
88 See, e.g., Ali v. Douglas Cable Communications, 929 F. Supp. 1362, 1380 (D. Kan.
1996) (dismissing complaint because plaintiff could not produce material indicating that
personal information was taped).
89 18 U.S.C. §§2510-20 (1994).
90 See e.g., Baumhart, supra note 14, at 924 (stating that impetus for "Act' was
increased threat to civil liberties by unregulated electronic privacy intrusions). See
generally Richard M. Schall, Employee Privacy Rights, 581 PLI/LIT 865, 871 (1998)
(noting that special needs of employers [to monitor employees] have been satisfied by new
technologies).
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within the Act's purview. 91 The Amendment, entitled the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act 92  (hereinafter "the
EPCA"), added to Title III's prohibitions the unauthorized
interceptions of electronic communications with the
acknowledgement that an individual's interests in his private
communication does not change based on the medium used.93 For
purposes of clarification communications protected in the act are
defined as "[A]ny transfer of signs, signals, writings, images,
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole
or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric or
photooptical system that affects interstate commerce." 94
Facts indicate that the EPCA was a long time in the coming as
recent estimates speculate that more than 20 million Americans
regularly use E-Mail at work,95 and that 66 percent of all
workers are subject to electronic monitoring by their employers. 96
In one scholar's mind the adoption of this statute might be too
late because the monitoring of E-mail is already established:
As technology develops in sophistication, however,
commentators debate whether modern technology has given
the employer so much control over the workplace that the
balance of power between employees and employers must be
readjusted by law to ensure adequate employee privacy. The
new technologies have thus generated a fundamental
uncertainty concerning the privacy rights of employees, as
the freedom from monitoring by one's employer is
increasingly perceived as being outside the scope of
91 See Baumhart, supra note 14, at 924 (stating that statute "needed broadening" to
bring e-mail into its purview); see also Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Technology Advances in the
Information Age: Effects on Workplace Privacy Issues, SC 08 ALI - ABA 599, 603 (1997)
(concluding that employers are [now] required to obtain employee consent before
monitoring e-mail).
92 See 18 U.S.C. §§2510-21 (1988).
93 See Baumhart, supra note 14, at 925 (explaining that EPCA focuses on e-mail
communications).
94 18 U.S.C §2510(12) (1988).
95 See Steven B. Winters, Do Not Fold , Spindle or Mutilate: An Examination of
Workplace Privacy in Electronic Mail, 1 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 85, 87 (1992)
(citing various modern workplace statistics); see also Paul F. Gerhart, Employee Privacy
Rights in the United States, 17 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 175, 175 (1995) (citing survey indicating
that 22% of 301 American Companies reported searching employee communication filed
and estimating that 20 Million workers are subject to monitoring); Thomas R. Greenberg,
E-Mail and Voice Mail: Employee Privacy and the Federal Wiretap Statute, 44 AM. U. L.
REV. 219, 222 n. 9 (1999) (noting that 66.2% of employers responding to survey who
monitor employees do not notify them of this practice).
96 See Gantt, supra note 3, at 346.
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reasonable privacy expectations. [citations omitted]97
Because the EPCA is simply an amendment to the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,98 it is subject to the same
exceptions discussed above, and runs similar risks of permitting
invasions of employee privacy. At this time, however, few federal
cases have explicitly applied the EPCA to an e-mail issue.99 In
Steve Jackson Games v. United States Secret Service,100 the
plaintiff operated a computer bulletin board for testing games.10 1
One of the plaintiffs employees was allegedly accessing software
illegally, and the Secret Service seized all related computers. 102
The court awarded damages to the plaintiffs, wading through the
complexities that new technologies present to older statutes
before reaching its conclusion.103
One can only speculate what future changes might evolve in
the new world of internet technology. The hardware of
computers is even more complex than that of phones, so
employees are even less likely to detect employer intrusions into
this form of communication. 104 This increases the opportunity for
employer exploitation, and demands a closer look at the EPCA.
It is clear, however, that E-mail will be a new battleground for
employee privacy rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
The traditional employment relationship favors the employer
and Congress attempted to create a number of federal statutes to
protect the interests of workers. The new wave of technology has
97 See Gantt, supra note 3, at 346.
98 See 18 U.S.C. §§2510-20 (1994).
99 See Davis v. Gregory, 111 F.3d 1472, 1475-76 (10th Cir. 1997) (discussing suit
brought by defendant against officers who searched his computer); Steve Jackson Games
v. United States Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994) (discussing case where
Secret Service seized plaintiffs computers); see also Bast, supra note 17, at 850-51
(describing Steve Jackson Games as only e-mail interception court case).
100 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
101 See id. at 458.
102 See id. at 459.
103 See id. at 464 (holding that seizure did not violate Federal Wiretap Act).
104 See Sarah E. Burns, Evidence of a Sexually Hostile Workplace: What is it and How
Should it be Assessed After Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 21 NYU REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 357, 415 (1994) (noting Supreme Court case restricting employer activities
exploiting employer - employee power deficiency); Gantt, supra note 3, at 349 (observing
technological complexities of E-Mail and unliklihood that employees will know that theirs
is monitored)
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brought the workplace to yet another ground of tension between
worker and employee interests. At present, the privacy
provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
and its amendment are insufficient to face this challenge. Either
a new form of privacy protection must evolve or an unfortunate
new world order of monitoring and privacy will be
instituted... and people will hate their jobs more than ever.
Patrick Boyd
